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Purpose and Objectives 
Target Corp. has suffered over $252 million losses since a data breach that occurred in 2013. Because of 
this breach, Target faces many class-action lawsuits from their stakeholders. In March of 2015, Target 
offered a $10 million settlement in a data breach lawsuit to implement changes to its security policies 
(Park, 2015). Target’s major data breach is a wake-up call to many companies, particularly companies 
that rely heavily on electronic information systems. Whether a data breach is caused by a hacker or a by 
human error, there may be damages that not only impact consumers but also impact the company itself 
as reputational harm can significantly affect a company’s bottom line.  
As many companies rely heavily on information technology, the risk of cybersecurity continues to 
increase (Rahm, 2014). In response to the frequent and severe cybersecurity breaches of publicly traded 
companies, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in 2011 issued a financial statement 
disclosure guidance (SEC, 2011). This disclosure requires public companies to disclose cybersecurity risks 
and material breaches in their SEC filings. However, this guidance is not a “rule, regulation, or 
statement” of the SEC (SEC, 2011). SEC Guidance requires public companies to disclose the data breach 
if it is material –  however materiality is never defined – thus leaving the company to decide whether a 
cybersecurity breach is material or not. If not material, then companies will be at liberty to decide on 
the amount of information they wish to disclose on the breach in their financial statements.  
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act brought new attention to public companies about the concept of materiality 
(Vorhies, 2005). Materiality is something that will affect investors’ decisions, if it impacts the financial 
statement. In this paper, I will examine public companies’ financial statement (10k, 8Q, 10Q) before and 
after they have suffered a major data breach. The list of companies suffering data breach will be 
retrieved from the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse (PRC). Some companies have suffered multiple breaches 
within a year which leads to the question, should they disclose these breaches, even though these 
breaches independently are not material? In this paper, I am going to discuss what research has been 
published on cybersecurity breach related issues, and I plan to develop further research questions on 
cybersecurity disclosure related issues. This study should be of interest to SEC, investors, and other 
professionals that are concerned with cybersecurity disclosure.   
Introduction 
On October 13, 2011, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission issued a guidance on corporate 
disclosure of cyber-risks and information security breaches (SEC, 2011). To determine if a company 
disclosed information on the breach, I reviewed the company’s risk factors, management’s discussion 
and analysis of financial conditions and results of operations, description of the business, legal 
proceedings, financial statement disclosures, and disclosure controls and procedures. However, the 
disclosure regulations from this guidance are vague and thus do little to force disclosure of valuable 
information. The guidance has led to companies disclosing ambiguous, generic risk factors that can be 
applied to any business in any industry (Ferraro, 2014).  
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If the SEC adopts the guidelines as full-fledged rules, this will eliminate any doubt as to company’s 
responsibilities for disclosure. This should improve transparency in financial statement reporting and 
improve investor decision making. However, companies tend to limit disclosure of information in their 
financial statements that may hurt their reputation. Therefore, instead of being proactive, companies 
will only disclose the minimum of what the SEC requires. In response to reports of major corporate 
cyber-breaches, the SEC held a “cyber roundtable” in March of 2014 bringing together industry groups 
and public and private sector participants to discuss whether additional SEC guidance is necessary 
related to the level of disclosure in a company’s public filings (Gotshal, 2015). However, neither the SEC 
nor its staff has taken any formal action as a follow-up to the March 2014 roundtable. 
The goal of this literature review is to report how the SEC guidance has affected disclosure in registrant’s 
financial statements. Relevant research suggests that there is ambiguity in this guidance, which is 
unclear on materiality. Therefore, companies use their own judgement when deciding whether a breach 
should be disclosed. Investors require transparency in financial statement reporting. Thus if a company 
suffers from a material breach, investors will benefit from having the information breach disclosed. The 
literature review begins with a brief summary of Cybersecurity Disclosure, the impact of a weak 
definition of materiality, including commentary on the potential harm the “guidance” causes, and the 
impact of SEC disclosure. The case study of Target is presented in this paper, which sets the context for 




The costs of recent data breaches costs have risen by 26% to 11.6 million per company in 2013, 
(compared to 2012). The total number of breaches in 2013 is 62% greater than in 2012, with a total of 
over 550 million personal identities exposed, such as credit card information and birth date (Rahm 
2014). As reported events of information security breaches increased and Congress pushed for more 
disclosure regulation from public companies, the SEC issued guidance on October 13, 2011 on corporate 
disclosure of cyber-risks and information security breaches. Much like other disclosure requirements 
mandated by federal securities laws, the Disclosure Guidance Topic No. 2 –Cybersecurity (CF DG 2) 
requires disclosure of significant business risk regarding cybersecurity.  
The guidance suggests disclosing the facts and circumstances of specific and material cybersecurity risks. 
Potential risks include operational, outsourcing, undetected attacks, past occurrences, and insurance 
coverage (Grant 2014). When determining whether to disclose a breach, the company should consider 
risk factors, management’s discussion and analysis of financial condition and results of operations, 
description of the business, legal proceedings, financial statement disclosures, and disclosure controls 
and procedures (Young 2013). In regards to specific attacks, companies should disclose the nature, 
occurrence, cost, and consequences of the attack. In addition to disclosing the costs of actual attacks, 
companies should also disclose costs of potential attacks, which can be difficult to estimate, but should 
include remediation, cybersecurity, lost revenues, regulatory fines, litigation costs, and reputational 
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damages. Although this disclosure requirement is not a ruling, the guidance can impose sanctions and 
fines on companies that the SEC deems to be non-compliant (Grant 2014). The purpose of the guidance 
is to assist public companies in preparing disclosures required by the Securities Act of 1933 and maintain 
the accurate and complete information in the financial statement. However, the SEC guidance is not 
legally binding due to vague definitions (Goolsby 2011). The studies that have been done on the 
materiality of the Cybersecurity breaches disclosure are reviewed below. 
Materiality 
The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) defined materiality in Financial Accounting Concepts 
Statement no. 2, Qualitative Characteristics of Accounting Information: "The magnitude of an omission 
or misstatement of accounting information that, in the light of surrounding circumstances, makes it 
probable that the judgment of a reasonable person relying on the information would have been 
changed or influenced by the omission or misstatement" (C, T. G., DePree, Chauncey M.,,Jr, & Grant, G. 
H., 2000). 
In addition to FASB’s definition, the SEC issued Staff Accounting Bulletin (SAB) no. 99, which is similar to 
the interpretation of materiality upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court. Materiality is defined as "a 
substantial likelihood that the ... fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having 
significantly altered the `total mix' of information made available" (Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 
1988). Although FASB and the U.S. Supreme Court define materiality, there are many companies who 
disclosed general cybersecurity risk with little and vague information. 
Stronger definition. 
The biggest weakness of the guidance is the requirement of disclosing “material” breaches and the SEC’s 
failure to provide clear guidance. This has lead to many disagreements between the companies and the 
SEC over their compliance of Disclosure Guidance Topic No. 2 –Cybersecurity (CF DG 2) (Ferraro 2013). 
The SEC should adapt the guideline as formal rules with specific dollar and percentage of assets 
thresholds, and with certain protections against unfair hindsight judgement, that will present a 
significant advancement in the SEC’s stated mission of protecting investors and promoting fair and 
efficient markets (Young 2013). When the definition of materiality is refined, this will eliminate the 
disagreement between companies and the SEC, and promote the overall goal of the SEC to protect the 
interest of the stakeholders.  
Overreach. 
The guidance is limited in its effectiveness because it is just guidance, not a legislative rule, but carries 
the same weight of authority as the law itself, a clear violation of the Administrative Procedure Act 
(Ferraro 2013). The issuance of cybersecurity guidance may be an appropriate step for the SEC to take. 
However, this is a reason for concern about the challenges companies face when disclosing the risk 
associated with cyber security matters and cyber incidents (Goolsby 2011). Issuance of the Cybersecurity 
Disclosure guidance increases a company’s responsibility by increasing the transparency to the public 
and increasing cost to protect their cybersecurity.    
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Impact of the SEC Disclosure. 
The SEC Cybersecurity guidance fails to solve the information asymmetry problem between companies 
and stakeholders. The cybersecurity guidance issued by the SEC procedurally overreaches and 
substantively underachieves. The guidance overreaches because it is not a legislative rule but carries the 
same weight as legislation laws. The guidance also underachieves because the disclosure requirements 
are too vague (Ferraro 2013). Ferraro suggests that SEC should re-evaluate the SEC cybersecurity 
disclosure guidance and make it into a legislative rule. An improvement to CF DG 2 is needed by issuing 
it as a legislative rule after the required notice and comment period that would ensure a more sound 
policy as stakeholders would have the opportunity to weigh in (Ferraro 2013). The requirement to 
disclose the risk prior to the attack will help stakeholders understand the risk that the company is facing 
and how the company is remediating past security breaches (Grant 2014). 
As a result of the risks and costs, public companies are paying closer attention to cybersecurity including 
hiring additional IT security personnel, training existing internal agents, and upgrading IT software 
(Grant 2014). An appropriate cybersecurity oversight plan should include clearly defined roles and 
responsibilities, recruitment of cybersecurity experts, corporate policies governing cybersecurity, and a 
regular internal audits of cybersecurity oversight (Lunn 2014). One element of a cybersecurity program 
may be insurance coverage, because cybersecurity breaches can generate tremendous amounts of loss 
to a company. Therefore, the insurance is needed to reduce the amount that a company can lose as a 
result of breaches (Daniel 2014).  
Although companies can use cybersecurity insurance to mitigate the risk and reduce the cost, paying 
close attention to IT governance is the key. It is a legal duty of directors in every publicly traded 
company. The shareholders can sue directors for any damages resulting from failure to protect cyber-
security (Clark 2013). The litigation and enforcement actions are becoming common when a company 
encounters security breaches of personal information. For example, The Federal Trade Commission filed 
suit against international hospitality operator Wyndham Worldwide Corp. for “alleged data security 
failures that led to three data breaches at Wyndham hotels in less than two years” (Trautman 2012). 
Although cybersecurity protection is expansive due to unpredictable probability and costs of data 
breaches, top management has to decide whether to invest heavily in new technology to secure the 
protection or to purchase cybersecurity insurance (Daniel 2014). It would be to a company’s best 
interest to protect, improve its IT security and follow SEC requirements to disclose any cybersecurity 
risks and breaches (Trautman 2012). Overall, it is critical to strengthen cybersecurity and be proactive in 
data risk management (Sophie 2014). There are advantages and disadvantages for increasing the 
cybersecurity disclosure regulation, but it will be in the best interest of stakeholders- SEC, investors, and 
other professionals who are interested in this piece of information.  
Gap of the Literature Review 
Since SEC Cybersecurity disclosure guidance is a fairly new requirement, there is not much research on 
this topic. More studies have been done that focus on interpretation of the guidance, rather than the 




In Target’s 2014 Financial Statement under Data Security and Privacy Risks section, Target reported the 
following: 
“We have recorded significant expenses related to the Data Breach. Our losses could exceed the 
amounts we have recorded by material amounts, and these matters could have a material 
adverse impact on our results of operations.” (Target 2014 10-K, 2015) 
Although Target disclosed the 2013 data breach expense on the 2014 10Q report, Target did not report 
such expenses on the yearend 10-K Income Statement for 2013 data breach expenses. The question 
remains as to whether or not Target should report data breach expenses on the 10K too.  
See Table 1 for Target’s 2014 Income Statement and Table 2 for Target’s 2014 10-Q Income Statement. 
Target 2014 Consolidated Statements of 
Operations 
         
          

















































Gain on receivables transaction — 
 
(391 ) (161 ) 
Earnings from continuing operations 
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Discontinued operations, net of tax (4,085 ) (723 ) (316 ) 
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Basic (loss)/earnings per share       






Discontinued operations (6.44 ) (1.14 ) (0.48 ) 




Diluted (loss)/earnings per share       






Discontinued operations (6.38 ) (1.13 ) (0.48 ) 




Weighted average common shares 
outstanding 







    


















       
 
Table 2  








Expenses Incurred and Amounts 
Accrued   





Receivable   (millions) 
Balance at February 1, 2014 $ 61 
  
  $ 44 
  







Payments made/cash received (35 )   (13 ) 
Balance at May 3, 2014 $ 52 
  





After disclosure of SEC cybersecurity guidance, companies’ disclosure on data breaches and 
cybersecurity has increased. There are studies on the interpretation the Guidance itself, but there are 
limited amounts of studies done regarding the effectiveness of the guidance. This literature review 
addresses the gap of the SEC cybersecurity guidance for further research questions. This literature 
review raises the concern of weakness of the disclosure. Further research is needed to address how 
companies react to the disclosure, which will bring more concern about cybersecurity guidance to SEC, 
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